FIRES FOLLOWING THE GREAT HANSHIN EARTHQUAKE IN KOBE

INTRODUCTION

At 5:46 a.m., on January 17, 1995, an earthquake, which epicenter was only 14 km under the ground and the hypocentral region was just beneath Kobe city, registered 7.2 on the Richter scale. As Kobe city is Japan's sixth largest city with a population of 1.4 million, the damage caused by this massive earthquake was the worst in postwar Japan. The Great Hanshin Earthquake destroyed more than 200,000 buildings killing more than 5,500 people, and injuring and burying over 40,000 others. More than 200 fires broke out after the earthquake and burnt down more than 7,000 houses or areas of over 65 hectares killing more than 350 people who had been buried under the damaged structures.

LARGE NUMBER OF SIMULTANEOUS IGNITIONS

During the first 3 days following the earthquake, more than 200 fires occurred in Hyogo and Osaka prefectures ¹⁾. Of those, 138 fires took place in Kobe city ²⁾. Table 1 lists number of post-earthquake fires by date in 7 cities where the damages of structures were very severe. In 13 minutes after the earthquake, 60 fires broke out in Kobe city. Figure 1 shows 150 fire sites where the investigations by Building Research Institute were conducted.

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Name of	Jan. 17	Jan. 17	Jan. 17	Jan. 17	Jan. 17	Jan. 17	Jan. 18	Jan. 19	
Ward and City	-6:00	-7:00	-8:00	-9:00	-24:00	Total	Total	Total	Total
Nishi	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Tarumi	0	0	0	0	6	6	0	0	6
Suma	4	4	0	4	1	13	2	1	16
Nagata	13	1	0	0	3	17	1	4	22
Hyogo	11	0	2	1	3	17	4	3	24
Kita	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1
Chuo	8	4	2	1	5	20	3	3	26
Nada	13	0	1	1	2	17	2	0	19
Higashi-Nada	10	1	2	1	3	17	2	4	23
Kobe	60	10	7	8	24	109	14	15	138
Ashiya .	6	3			2	11	1	2	14
Nishinomiya	7	11	4	1	3	26	2	3	31
Takarazuka	2				2	4			4
Itami	2	2	2	1		7			7
Kawanishi	1	2				3			3
Amagasaki	3	2			2	7			7
Total	81	30	13	10	33	167	17	20	214

Table 1. Number of Post-earthquake Fires by Date in Kobe, Ashiya, Nishinomiya Takarazuka. Itami, Kawanishi and Amagasaki in Hyogo Prefecture. 21, 31




Figure 1. 150 Investigated Fire Sites (Major Fires are included)

LARGE CONFLAGRATIONS

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Table 2 lists Number of large fires (burned area, $3,300m^2$), middle fires ($1,000-3,300m^2$), small fires ($-1,000m^2$), confined fires and fire loss. 7 fires spread over $33,000 m^2$.

Table 2. Number of Post-earthquake Fires by Area and Fire Loss									
Name of	No. of	No. of	No. of	No. of	Total	Total Number	Total area		
Ward and City	Large	Middle	Small	Confine	No. of	of burned	of fire sites		
	Fires	Fires	Fires	d Fires	Fires	Buildings	m ²		
Nishi	0	0	0	1	1	1	77		
Tarumi	0	0	0	5	5	5	173		
Suma	3	2	4	3	12	351	98,552		
Nagata-Suma	-	-	-		-	1583	-		
Nagata	14	3	2	3	22	2926	303,558		
Hyogo	4	4	5	1	14	972	127,055		
Kita	0	0	0	1	1	1	54		
Chuo	0	3	3	. 16	22	88	14,542		
Nada	3	4	6	5	18	561	65,318		
Higashi-Nada	3	5	3	9	20	333	32,886		
Kobe	27	21	23	44	115	6814	642,215		
Ashiya	0	0	3	11	14	22	2,925		
Nishinomiya	0	1	7	22	30	66	8,259		
Takarazuka	0	0	3	11	14	-	-		
Itami	0	0	0	7	7	7	-		
Kawanishi 🚬	0	0	0	3	3	3	-		
Amagasaki	0	2	0	5	7	10	2,090		
Total	27	24	34	95	180	6922	655,489		

 Table 2. Number of Post-earthquake Fires by Area and Fire Loss ^{1), 2), 4)}

Figure 2 shows large conflagrations which area is over $3,300 \text{ m}^2$ in Nagata, Suma, Hyogo, Nada and Higashi-Nada Ward.




Figure 2. Large Conflagrations in Kobe City⁴⁾

HINDRANCE TO FIREFIGHTING

Public firefighting capabilities were severely strained after the earthquake. Fire departments were inundated with numerous demands involving, not only fire, but structural damage, search and rescue, gas leaks, and medical aid. There were more than 10,000 people who were buried under the rubble and some dispatched firefighters were forced to rescue buried people instead of putting out the fires. 80 fire brigades of 292 firefighters at 11 fire stations in Kobe city responded these demands at first hand. In 5 hours, 90 percentage of 1,094 fire fighters came to their fire stations ⁵⁾. Table 3 shows the number of fires in 13 minutes after the earthquake and the number of fire brigades which were on duty at 6:00 a.m., on January 17, 1995. The firefighting forces were overwhelmed by large number of simultaneous ignitions.

In the wards where the number of fires at 6:00 a.m. is greater than the number of fire brigades on duty at that time, fires spread very widely.

brigades which were on duty at 6:00 a.m., on January 17, 1995 in Kobe ^{2),}									
Name of Ward			No. of Fire	No. of Fire					
	6:00 a.m.	Fires	Brigades on Duty	Fighters on Duty					
		(3,300 m ² -)	at 6:00 a.m.	at 6:00 a.m.					
Nishi	1	0	8	29					
Tarumi	0	0	8	29					
Suma	4	3	9	33					
Nagata	13	14	7	24					
Hyogo	11	4	6	22					
Kita	0	0	11	37					
Chuo	8	0	16	63					
Nada	13	3	7	26					
Higashi-Nada	10	3	8	29					
Total	60	27	80	282					

Table 3	8. Numb)er o	f fires	in 13	mi	nute	s after the	e earthg	uake and	l th	e numb	er of fi	re
	briga	des	which	were	on	duty	v at 6:00 a	.m., on	January	17,	1995 in	1 Kobe ²	1), 5)
> *	C 77 7 1				3.7	C 7	1.7	6.75'			6 701		

The wards indicated with italic fonts had greater number of fires than fire brigades.

There were traffic congestion with private cars on the main streets where the traffic lights were not working because of the power failure. This traffic jam and the collapsed buildings on the narrow streets caused delay of fire brigades arrival within the city and from other cities as mutual aid. The shortage of water was the primary factor in conflagration. Fire hydrants and in Kobe city were damaged by the tremble and small underground fire tanks had limited quantity of water. Inoperable fire hydrants forced firefighters to draw water from school swimming pools, the Shin-Minato River and finally from the port. Fire hoses were extended more than 1 km from the port and were often broken on the main streets by trespassing vehicles. Fire officials requested that the Water Works Department provide the water held in the reservoirs to fight blazes, but they declined to give a quick reply, saying they wanted to ensure that supplies of drinking water were continued. Nearly 12 hours after the quake, the reservoir water was released to fight the fires ⁶.

FIRE SPREAD MECHANISMS

In addition to hindrance to firefighting, the fire spread widely because the buildings were so close together especially in Nagata and Hyogo ward. In those fire sites in Nagata and Hyogo ward,


there were a lot of old wooden houses which exterior walls were not covered with noncombustible materials. Although some relatively new wooden houses had been covered with non-combustible materials, they were damaged by the earthquake.


The combustible contents of the houses, synthetic rubber in small shoes factories especially in Nagata ward and collapsed buildings on the street contributed to the fire spread $^{4)}$.

There are at least 20 evidences of sight that new ignitions was caused by burning wood and embers flying through the air ¹⁾. Fireproof roofing was shaken down by the earthquake, it was easy to ignite with burning wood and embers in those wooden house areas, although people out there extinguished most of small ignitions.

VELOCITY OF FIRE SPREAD


Fire spread was relatively slow, averaging about 20 to 30 meters per hour. The main reason of this slow speed was that there was slow wind and sometimes no wind in the day of earthquake. The average wind velocity in Kobe was 2.6 meters per second. The second factor of fire spread velocity is the types of buildings. There are some evidences of sight that the fire spread faster in the blocks of wooden buildings without non-combustible materials on the exterior wall than in the blocks of wooden buildings without non-combustible materials and in the blocks which have some fire resistive buildings. Figure 3 shows an example of fire spread recorded by news videos.





: Counter line at certain time

Figure 3. Contour Line of Fire Spread (Fire Site around the Mizukasa Nishi Park)



Index for building structure

- : Fire resistive building
- ▲ : Semi-fire resistance building
- : Wooden building with non-combustible materials on the exterior wall
- \circ : Wooden building without non-combustible materials on the exterior wall

Index for Ignition

 \star : Fire origin (Estimated by the evidence of sight)

Index for Fire Spread

- $\star r$: Ignition by burning wood and embers flying through the air
 - (Estimated by the evidence of sight)
- \in : Fire Spread through the collapsed building on the street by fire

Index for Fire-Arresting Line

- ----- : Fire spread boundaries
- : Partially burned building
- . Fire damage only on the exterior wall

Figure 4. Fire Site around the Sugawara Market






Figure 5. Fire Site of Eigeyama South





3 Center of this picture was the Sugawara Market.

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



Figure 8. Buildings and rubble in the Fire Site of Eigeyama South



gure 8. Buildings and rubble in the Fire Site of Eigeyama South (continued)

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FIRE-ARRESTING LINE

Figure 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 show the buildings which were not burned or partially burned at firearresting lines of larger fire sites ⁴⁾. Table 4 indicate the fire stop factors at the fire-arresting lines around the major large fire sites which area exceeds 33,000 square meters $^{7),8)}$.

Table 4. Fire Stop Factors at the Fire-Arresting Lines										
	Main	Open	Fire	Suppression	Total	Area ⁴⁾	Ignition			
	Street,	Space	Resistive				Time ³⁾			
Major Fire sites	Railroad		building		m	m^2				
Mizukasa Nishi Park	42%	23%	27%	8%	2,345	121,783	7-9 a.m.			
Sugawara Market	40	33	27	0	1,320	77,297	instant			
Takahashi Hospital	65	24	10	2	1,258	68,850	instant			
Eigeyama South	23	34	25	17	2,745	61,337	instant			
Shin-Nagata Sta. S.	59	11	25	5	1,058	39,570	instant			
Kobe Department S.	24	16	34	26	1,080	35,100	7 a.m.			
Nishidai Market	23	25	28	24	1,195	34,407	instant			
Total	38	25	25	12	11,001	438,344	-			

Table 4. Fire Stop Factors at the Fire-Arresting Lines ^{7), 8)}

Ignition time is of 17 January 1995.

CONCLUSION

Fortunately the wind was weak during the first hours after the earthquake, catastrophic fires such as the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake Fire were avoided. Further studies including detailed analysis of fire spread mechanisms and experimental study for the condition with strong winds are necessary for the disaster prevention planning.

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